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Improved the verifier to be even more resilient.
Theoretically, an attacker could construct a FlatBuffer with the sole purpose of making verification really expensive, essentially DOS-ing a server that uses verification on FlatBuffers. This adds a max table depth and max table amount at which point the verifier declares the buffer malformed. Bug: 16301336 Change-Id: I6b098c31d030d24c19e852b33609110658e66aa9 Tested: on OS X
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@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ a full traversal (since any scalar data is not actually touched),
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and since it may cause the buffer to be brought into cache before
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reading, the actual overhead may be even lower than expected.
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In specialized cases where a denial of service attack is possible,
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the verifier has two additional constructor arguments that allow
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you to limit the nesting depth and total amount of tables the
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verifier may encounter before declaring the buffer malformed.
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## Text & schema parsing
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Using binary buffers with the generated header provides a super low
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